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Summary
Meeting the targets of climate change mitigation set by the Paris Agreement entails a huge
transformation of the energy sector, as low- or no-carbon technologies must gradually
substitute traditional, fossil-based technologies. In this perspective, the vast majority of
energy analyses and scenarios project a fundamental role of Carbon Capture & Storage
(CCS). However, uncertainty remains on the actual techno-economic feasibility of this
technology: despite the considerable investment over the recent past, commercial maturity
is yet to come. The main aim of this work is to evaluate the impacts of a progressively
delayed deployment of CCS plants from a climate, energy, and economic perspective,
focusing in particular on the power sector. This is carried out with the Integrated
Assessment Model WITCH, exploring a wide set of long-term scenarios over mitigation
targets ranging from 1.5°C to 4°C in terms of global temperature increase in 2100 with
respect to the pre-industrial levels. The analysis shows that CCS will be a key mitigation
option at a global level for carbon mitigation, achieving about 30% of the electricity mix in
2100 (with a homogeneous distribution across coal, gas, and biomass) if its deployment is
unconstrained. If CCS deployment is delayed or forbidden, penetration cannot reach the
optimal unconstrained level, resulting in a mix rearrangement, with a strong increase in
renewables and, to a lesser extent, nuclear. The mitigation targets can be met, but policy
costs without the implementation of CCS are from 35% to 72% higher than in the
corresponding unconstrained scenarios.
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Abstract

Meeting the targets of climate change mitigation set by the Paris Agreement entails a huge transformation
of the energy sector, as low- or no-carbon technologies must gradually substitute traditional, fossil-based
technologies. In this perspective, the vast majority of energy analyses and scenarios project a fundamental
role of Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS). However, uncertainty remains on the actual techno-economic
feasibility of this technology: despite the considerable investment over the recent past, commercial
maturity is yet to come.
The main aim of this work is to evaluate the impacts of a progressively delayed deployment of CCS plants
from a climate, energy, and economic perspective, focusing in particular on the power sector. This is
carried out with the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH, exploring a wide set of long-term scenarios over
mitigation targets ranging from 1.5°C to 4°C in terms of global temperature increase in 2100 with respect to
the pre-industrial levels.
The analysis shows that CCS will be a key mitigation option at a global level for carbon mitigation, achieving
about 30% of the electricity mix in 2100 (with a homogeneous distribution across coal, gas, and biomass) if
its deployment is unconstrained. If CCS deployment is delayed or forbidden, penetration cannot reach the
optimal unconstrained level, resulting in a mix rearrangement, with a strong increase in renewables and, to
a lesser extent, nuclear. The mitigation targets can be met, but policy costs without the implementation of
CCS are from 35% to 72% higher than in the corresponding unconstrained scenarios.
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1.

Introduction

Climate change mitigation is acknowledged as one of the major challenges that the mankind will have to
face in the 21st century (IPCC, 2014). With the Paris Agreement, reached in 2015 during the Conference of
Parties 21 (COP21), almost all countries of the world have committed to pursuing the ambitious target of
limiting to 2°C the global temperature increase in 2100 with respect to the pre-industrial levels, making all
the possible efforts to stay as close to 1.5°C as possible, in order to further limit detrimental climate
impacts (Schellnhuber et al., 2016). However, these targets are very difficult to be reached, as they entail
huge technological and economic transformations, as well as an internationally coordinated action.
Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) has widely been recognized as one of the main technological solutions to
decarbonize the energy sector and virtually all research studies project a considerable role in future
mitigation pathways (see for instance Krey et al., 2014 and Koelbl et al., 2014), especially if the target is to
stay below 2°C (Rogelj et al., 2015). This technology consists in capturing the carbon dioxide generated in
plants fed with fossil fuels or biomass and storing it in proper underground deposits or marine aquifers
(IEA, 2013). Its main advantage is the possibility to achieve a (theoretically) zero carbon energy generation
adopting fossil fuels plants, i.e. without massively reconsidering the current generation paradigm that still
dominates the energy sector (IEA, 2017). Indeed, even negative emissions can be achieved if CCS plants are
fed with biomass which is replaced at a pace equal to consumption: in this case, the carbon neutrality
related to the use of biomass (net of the emissions associated to the whole life cycle concerning harvesting,
transport, etc.) is complemented by the CO2 removal in the CCS plant. An additional advantage is related to
the dispatchability of these plants, which is a fundamental aspect in a future energy scenario where nondispatchable renewables (primarily wind and solar) will likely reach significant shares in the electricity mix.
CCS availability would also entail economic savings in pursuing mitigation targets (Davidson et al., 2017).
However, large-scale CCS deployment is yet to come. Safety concerning the stability of storage sites, public
acceptance, high technology costs, incomplete or unclear regulatory framework, the absence of business
models, and a general uncertainty on the socio-economic impacts are major obstacles that still hinder the
take-off of this technology (Creutzig et al., 2013 and Muratori et al., 2016). As a result, very few and small
scale plants have been installed so far (GCCSI, 2017).
In this context, the main objective of this work is to investigate the role that CCS could play in carbon
mitigation and in particular assess the techno-economic impacts that a progressively delayed deployment
of this technology can have both in terms of rearrangement of the energy mix and in terms of policy costs.
In other words, how urgent is it to start installing CCS plants for the feasibility and affordability of achieving
more and more stringent climate targets?
This study has a global scope and focuses on the electricity sector. The research is carried out adopting the
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) WITCH.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the WITCH model, and especially how the power
sector and CCS technologies are modeled therein. Section 3 reports the scenario design. Section 4 reports
and extensively discusses the most relevant results of the analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2.

Methodology

2.1 The WITCH model
The tool adopted in this research is the World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) model. WITCH is a
dynamic optimization IAM designed to investigate the socio-economic impacts of climate change over the
21st century (Bosetti et al., 2006 and Emmerling et al., 2016) with time steps of five years. It combines a
top-down, simplified representation of the global economy with a bottom-up, detailed description of the
energy sector, nested in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) structure (Figure 1). The model is defined
on a global scale: countries are grouped into thirteen aggregated regions, which strategically interact
according to a non-cooperative Nash game. The thirteen economic regions are USA (United States),
WEURO (Western EU and EFTA countries), EEURO (Eastern EU countries), KOSAU (South Korea, South Africa
and Australia), CAJAZ (Canada, Japan and New Zealand), TE (Transition Economies, namely Russia and
Former Soviet Union states and non-EU Eastern European countries), MENA (Middle East and North Africa),
SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa except South Africa), SASIA (South Asian countries except India), EASIA (South-East
Asian countries), CHINA (People’s Democratic Republic of China and Taiwan), LACA (Latin America and
Central America) and INDIA (India). As the model acronym suggests, technological change is endogenously
modeled and it regards energy efficiency and the capital cost of specific clean technologies. The climate
model MAGICC6 is soft-linked to WITCH (Meinshausen et al., 2011), which allows translating the
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions calculated by WITCH into concentration, radiative forcing, and finally
atmospheric temperature increase.

Figure 1 – The CES structure in WITCH.
2
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2.2 The CES structure
The CES structure reported in Figure 1 shows how the top-down aggregated economic model is linked with
the disaggregated energy sector. In particular, energy services (ES) and the aggregated capital and labor
node (KL) are combined to produce the final economic output of the model. Energy services are provided
by the combination of the capital of energy R&D (RDEN), which is a proxy of energy efficiency, and the
actual energy generation (EN). This node models the fact that the same energy services can be obtained
through a lower level of energy input if there is higher energy efficiency. The EN node is divided between
the electric (EL) and non-electric sector (NEL), with a progressive disaggregation to the single technologies.
The electric sector has a higher detail, while the non-electric sector mostly reports nodes collecting
consumption from all the non-electric usages of one specific energy source. Road passenger and road
freight transport are the only demand sectors being explicitly modeled1 (see Bosetti and Longden, 2013,
and Carrara and Longden, 2017).
Focusing on the electric sector, the hydroelectric technology is found first (ELHYDRO), which is essentially
exogenous in the model. The other technologies converge to the EL2 node, which is divided between two
further nodes: EFLFFREN, i.e. the combination of fossils and renewables, and ELNUKE&BACK, i.e. the
combination of nuclear and backstop. The fossil node (ELFF) has three groups of technologies:
i) coal&biomass (ELCOALBIO), further divided into pulverized coal without CCS (ELPC), pulverized biomass
without CCS (ELPB), integrated gasification coal with CCS (ELCIGCC), and integrated gasification biomass
with CCS (ELBIGCC); ii) oil, only without CCS (ELOIL); iii) gas (ELGAS), with and without CCS (ELGASTR and
ELGASCCS, respectively). Variable renewable energies (ELW&S) have i) wind (ELWIND), further divided
between onshore (WINDON) and offshore (WINDOFF); ii) solar PV (ELPV); iii) solar CSP (ELCSP). Nuclear and
backstop feature traditional fission nuclear (ELNUKE) and a backstop technology (ELBACK). The latter
models a hypothetical future technology which generates electricity with no fuel costs and no carbon
emissions, although characterized by high capital costs. It can be interpreted as an advanced nuclear
technology, for instance nuclear fusion or advanced fast breeder fission reactors. However, this technology
is not considered in the scenarios explored in this work. Concerning the non-electric sector, the first
distinction is between traditional biomass (TradBiom), coal (COALnel) and the aggregated node formed by
oil, gas, and modern biomass (OGB), which features gas (GASnel), traditional biofuels (Trad Bio), and the
combination (OIL&BACK) between oil (OILnel) and a non-electric backstop technology, i.e. advanced
biofuels (BACKnel).
The CES structure tries to capture from a modeling point of view the preference for heterogeneity that is
experienced in the real world, where the choice of investing in energy technologies does not normally
depend on economic considerations only. The numbers reported in the CES scheme under the specific
nodes indicate the relevant elasticity of substitution. As suggested by the name, this value quantifies the
level of substitutability between the sub-nodes that converge in the specific node. Zero elasticity means
that the production factors are not substitutable and thus they are summed in fixed shares. Infinite
elasticity means that the production factors are completely interchangeable and thus the competition
between the two occurs on an economic basis only. Intermediate elasticities result in an intermediate
behavior. More details concerning the CES structure can be found in Carrara and Marangoni, 2017.

1

These sectors are not shown in the CES scheme.
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2.3 CCS modeling
WITCH models four CCS technologies, three in the electricity sector and one in the non-electric sector. The
three electric technologies have been listed in the previous section and feature coal, gas, and biomass (the
latter indicated with BECCS, in coherence with the literature). For all of them, the CCS technology directly
competes with the relevant non-CCS technology, to which it is related through an infinite elasticity. The
non-electric technology is applied to non-electric coal, even if it does not directly appear in the CES
structure and it is not considered in this work2.
CCS modeling occurs on two levels, one regarding the power technologies and the other regarding the
capture and storage costs.
Table 1 summarizes the main modeling assumptions for the three categories of CCS power plants3. In this
respect, it should be noted that no further technological differentiation is considered in this work within
each fuel category4. Concerning the data not reported in the table, O&M costs across regions are averagely
45 $/kW for gas and 75 $/kW for coal and biomass, respectively (only fixed O&M costs are considered).
Efficiency of coal plants starts at 39% in 2015, linearly increases up to 43% in 2050, and then remains
constant in the second part of the century. This is assumed to replicate the progress of the efficiency of
non-CCS plants subtracting a 7%-efficiency loss related to the capture and storage process. Efficiency in
biomass plants follows the same rationale, with a 10%-shift downwards. Efficiency in gas plants is regionally
differentiated in 2015 (values are comprised between 39% and 51%), with a common convergence to 55%
in 2050, which is held constant afterwards.

COAL CCS

GAS CCS

BECCS

Investment cost [$/kW]

3925

1856

5162

Lifetime [years]

40

25

25

Capacity factor

85%

70%

80%

Table 1 – Modeling assumptions for the CCS power plants.

2

For the sake of coherence, the working hypotheses in terms of CCS deployment which will be described in Section 3
have been applied to the non-electric sector too. However, this work focuses on the power sector, therefore no
further details are provided on the non-electric side.
3
If not differently specified, values are held constant across regions and over the century. Costs are expressed in
USD2015.
4
Indeed, a more refined modeling solution for CCS in the WITCH model has been developed and described in
Vinca et al., 2018, which includes a differentiation of the CCS power technologies (pre-combustion capture, postcombustion capture, oxyfuel technologies, etc.). However, such a detail has been deemed not to be necessary for the
purposes of this work where the CCS technology as a whole is focused, also considering the computational effort
required for the several scenarios developed.
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CO2 sequestration, transport, and storage are modeled via regional supply cost curves, which depend on
site availability. The unit cost curve CCCS(t,n) has a convex shape and is shown in Equation 1 (t and n refer to
time step and region, respectively):
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑛) = 𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑆 (𝑛) ∙ exp(𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑆 (𝑛) ∙ 𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑛)𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑆(𝑛) )

(1)

where MCCS(t,n) is the cumulated amount of CO2 captured over the years (the capture rate is fixed to 90%
for all the three power technologies), while a, α, β are parameters calibrated on the storage capacities in
the different regions as derived from IPCC, 2005, which estimates a global capacity between 1678 and
11100 GtCO2. The total CCS cost is finally computed by multiplying the unit cost CCCS by the amount of fuel
burnt in the relevant power plants.
Global prices of fossil fuels are endogenously calculated in WITCH, while the mean response functions
produced by the Global Biosphere Management Model (GLOBIOM, see Havlík et al., 2014) are adopted to
model land use. GLOBIOM provides biomass supply cost curves to WITCH for different economic and
mitigation trajectories. This allows assessing woody biomass availability and cost.

3.

Scenario design

The analysis considers a set of 25 scenarios where five climate targets are combined with five temporal
options related to CCS deployment. The five climate targets refer to the temperature increase in 2100 with
respect to the pre-industrial levels and are equal to 3.5°C, 3°C, 2.5°C, 2°C, and 1.5°C (the two latter are the
most relevant in the Paris Agreement perspective5). The five temporal options refer to the starting year
when investing in CCS is allowed. These years are 2020, 2040, 2060, and 2080, which are in addition to the
case where CCS is not installed at all. As investment takes time to materialize, this framework implies that
the first actual deployment year in the first four cases is 2025, 2045, 2065, and 2085, respectively (i.e. the
following time step). Somehow, the no CCS case would correspond to fixing the starting year of investment
in 2100, hence the first deployment year in 2105, i.e. after the temporal horizon of WITCH.
A complementary baseline or Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario has also been run, where no carbon policy
is applied. De facto this leads by construction to no CCS deployment: in the absence of a carbon signal,
there is no reason to invest in a carbon-removal technology which is by definition more expensive than the
corresponding non-CCS plants. The baseline scenario leads to a temperature increase in 2100 of about 4°C
in WITCH (precisely 4.08°C), which explains why the explored climate change mitigation targets start at
3.5°C.
Table 2 summarizes the different options within the climate target and investment dimensions. In
particular, the table provides the acronyms for the CCS deployment year which will be used in the graphs
shown in Section 4 (“i” stands for investment). The scenario names are generated combining the target and
the CCS year, e.g. 3.5C_i20 or 3C_i40.6
5

The goal of the Paris Agreement is to “keep a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius”
(UNFCCC, 2015).
6
This naming scheme does not apply to the Business-as-Usual scenario, which is simply called “Baseline”.
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Climate target
CCS first investment year

BAU, 3.5°C, 3°C, 2.5°C, 2°C, 1.5°C
2020 (i20), 2040 (i40), 2060 (i60), 2080 (i80), no CCS investment (ioff)
Table 2 – Scenario dimensions.

Figure 2 shows the temperature increase over the century in the 26 scenarios converging to the six climate
targets described above. It can be noted that, whereas all scenarios from 2°C upwards converge uniformly
towards the relevant target, the 1.5°C scenarios show a broader pattern. These scenarios, in fact, are at the
frontier of technical feasibility in WITCH and with a delayed deployment of CCS the convergence can take
place only slightly above 1.5°C (from exactly 1.5°C in the i20 case to 1.6°C in the ioff case), which negligibly
affects the results.

Figure 2 – Global temperature increase with respect to the pre-industrial levels.

The climate targets are reached via the application of a carbon tax on GHG emissions. The tax starts in 2020
and grows exponentially in order to yield the desired temperature increase. As will be shown in the next
section, the delayed or forbidden deployment of CCS plants causes by definition an increase in the
mitigation costs, as it hinders a technology option which would be otherwise used. This implies an increase
in the carbon tax if the same climate target is to be reached. Operatively, a common starting value has
been fixed for the different climate targets (referring to the database of similar optimized scenarios) and
then the growth rate has been recursively adjusted in order to reach the relevant temperature. No details
6
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are provided on the actual values implemented, as the economic focus will be put on the overall policy cost
(shown in Section 4) rather than on the specific carbon tax values, which are not within the interests of this
work.
Figure 3 shows the resulting GHG emission patterns in the different scenarios. In particular, Kyoto gases are
considered, i.e. carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases. 7

Figure 3 – Global GHG emissions.
In 2015 global GHG emissions accounted for 50 GtCO2eq. In the baseline scenario GHG emissions grow up
to about 100 GtCO2eq in 2080/2090, with a slight decrease towards the end of the century (94 GtCO2eq in
2100). The same pattern is found in the 3.5°C scenarios, where emissions peak at 78 GtCO2eq in 2070/2080
and then decrease to 70 GtCO2eq in 2100. The 3°C target entails that emissions remain substantially
constant all over the century, with a peak at 58 GtCO2eq in 2040 and a smooth decrease down to around
42 GtCO2eq in 2100. The 2.5°C target, instead, implies a constant emission decrease to about
15-20 GtCO2eq starting in 2030/2040 after a few decades of relative constancy. The 2°C target requires an
immediate and constant decrease, achieving a total net emission amount of few thousands of GtCO2eq in
7

The impact of non-CO2 gases is assessed via the Global Warning Potential technique. According to this scheme, each
GHG is associated to a coefficient which quantifies its relative greenhouse power with respect to carbon dioxide.
According to the last IPCC report (IPCC, 2014) the 100-year GWP is 28 for methane and 265 for nitrous oxide, while
fluorinated gases have a GWP in the order of hundreds or thousands.

7
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2100. Finally, the 1.5°C target would entail a sudden and dramatic cut of emissions by two or three times in
the very first years, with a constant decrease down to zero or even net negative emissions in 2100. As will
be discussed in the next section, the extraordinary fall in emissions after 2015 makes this set of scenarios
practically infeasible in this design. However, it is not within the scope of this work to discuss about the
feasibility of this emission pattern and the policy that would make it possible. Here the focus is on
understanding what role can be played by CCS in achieving these long-term targets and its technical and
economic impacts with a multi-decadal perspective.

4.

Results

It is interesting to start by observing how CCS deployment evolves at a global level in the scenario set, see
Figure 4. In general, the progressively more and more ambitious emission targets imply a progressively
more and more substantial rearrangement of the energy sector, and in particular of the power sector that
is focused in this work. In particular, the role of low-carbon or no-carbon power technologies, among which
CCS, progressively grows, until these technologies dominate the sector in the more stringent scenarios.
In the baseline case, no CCS deployment is observed. As already discussed in the previous section, if there is
no carbon signal, there is no need to install low-carbon technologies which are by far more expensive than
the corresponding non-CCS ones. The carbon signal is too low in the 3.5°C scenarios as well, except for a
negligible deployment in the last years of the century. From the 3°C target downwards, instead, CCS is
regularly installed. Figure 4 clearly shows that the delayed trigger to CCS deployment does have a
considerable effect: in all cases, as soon as CCS installation is permitted, it actually starts, with a constant
growth over the following decades. It is interesting to note that under no cases can CCS capacity reach the
level that is achieved if it can be deployed 20 years in advance. This is mostly due to the constraints
affecting the capacity growth that can physically take place over a five-year period, but it also highlights
that CCS is an option that is fully exploited in the unconstrained scenarios, if available. It can also be noted
that the CCS generation has a similar pattern across the scenario set, especially from 2.5°C to 1.5°C: in
2100, CCS generation reaches 113-134 EJ/yr in the i20 scenarios, 61-72 EJ/yr in the i40 scenarios, 29-35
EJ/yr in the i60 scenarios, and 8-10 EJ/yr in the i80 scenarios, respectively (by definition, it is zero in the ioff
scenarios).
Figure 5 provides a detail on the CCS generation in 2100. In addition to stressing that a late CCS deployment
leads to a lower CCS generation, the graph shows that the three CCS power technologies (coal, gas, and
biomass) provide quite a homogeneous contribution, even if late deployment seems to favor the BECCS
technologies. The ioff scenarios are not shown here for the reasons explained above.

8
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Figure 4 – Global CCS generation over time.

Figure 5 – Global CCS generation in 2100 by source.
9
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Figure 6 – Global curtailed energy conversion.

The impacts on the overall electricity generation are shown in Figure 6. Electricity generation starts from
90 EJ/yr in 2015 and progressively grows over time in all scenarios, with the partial exception of the 1.5°C
scenarios, which show a dramatic (and unlikely) decrease in the electricity generation associated to the
emission pattern discussed in the previous section: in these scenarios, it is not possible to massively
rearrange the power sector in such a short period to meet with the mitigation requirement, therefore the
only solution is to cut the overall generation. In the BAU scenarios, the final value in 2100 is 376 EJ/yr. As a
progressively increasing carbon tax is applied, the demand growth slightly slows down, at least until the
2.5°C scenarios: the 2°C scenarios show an opposite behavior, with a convergence in 2100 at around
400 EJ/yr, and even more so in the 1.5°C scenarios, which spread between 410 and 480 EJ/yr.
These results highlight the two possible and contrasting patterns to achieve carbon mitigation. On the one
hand, emissions can be reduced simply by reducing energy demand. On the other hand, emissions can be
reduced by shifting energy demand from highly emitting to low emitting fuels or carriers. As the power
sector shows more viable routes for decarbonization than other sectors, mitigation futures can arguably
entail an electrification of the energy sector with a parallel decarbonization of the power sector
(Capros et al., 2012 and Wei et al., 2013). The first tendency prevails in the milder scenarios, while the
opposite occurs in the more stringent scenarios.
Figure 7 shows the CCS relative penetration in the electricity mix as resulting from the previous two figures:
it can be noted that in the absence of deployment constraints, i.e. if investment is allowed from 2020, CCS
technologies can reach about 30% in the electricity mix in 2100.
10
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Figure 7 – Global CCS relative penetration in the electricity mix in 2100 by source.

Figures 8 and 9 provide a more general view on the overall electricity mix in 2100. The former shows the
absolute generation, while the latter focuses on the relative shares.
In the baseline scenario, fossil fuels (without CCS) dominate the electricity mix, accounting for 50% of the
total (coal 30%, gas 18%, and oil 2%). Nuclear accounts for 12% (substantially the same level as today),
hydro decreases to 7% (the hydro potential is not sufficient to maintain the current 16% share), while
variables renewables (wind and solar) account for 30%, approximately two thirds from wind and one third
from solar.
The 3.5°C scenarios are characterized by a very similar electricity mix, simply with a 10%-shift from fossils
to wind and solar. More impacts can be seen in the 3°C scenarios, i.e. where CCS technologies appear in a
non-negligible amount. As already noted, the delayed deployment of CCS implies lower and lower shares
for this technology in 2100. Its contribution is mostly compensated by renewables, nuclear, and also gas
without CCS, which is still a viable technology for this mild climate target. This no longer happens in the
more stringent climate targets. Figure 7 has already shown that in all these cases, CCS accounts for about
30% of the electricity mix in 2100 if its deployment is allowed starting from 2020. If CCS is constrained, as
there is no more room for non-CCS fossil technologies (apart from a negligible gas contribution in the 2.5°C
scenarios), the electricity mix tends to converge to a solution dominated by renewables (with about 35%
wind onshore, 10% wind offshore, 30% solar PV, and 5% solar CSP, i.e. 80% in total), with a complementary
contribution of nuclear (12%) and hydro (8%).

11
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Figure 8 – Global electricity mix in 2100: absolute generation.
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Figure 9 – Global electricity mix in 2100: relative shares.
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Concerning the latter result, it should be noted that such a huge penetration of renewables would imply a
profound re-structuring of the electricity system. From a modeling point of view, it is not easy to cope with
the system integration issues in IAMs, as the low temporal and spatial scales which characterize these
aspects are in contrast with the need of providing long-term projections over an horizon of decades,
considering aggregated annual quantities and focusing on large regions. However, it is not within the scope
of this paper to discuss these topics: here it is sufficient to underline that the model considers huge
investment in storage capacity and grid expansion to comply with this renewable deployment. The reader is
referred to Carrara and Marangoni, 2017 for further details on the WITCH model and to Pietzcker et al.,
2017 for an overview of IAMs.
In order to have a more dynamic view of the electricity mix without focusing on 2100 only, Figures from 10
to 13 show the evolution of the electricity mix over time in selected years (2025, 2050, 2075, and 2100) for
the two boundary groups of CCS deployment options, i.e. i20 (thus, the unconstrained CCS scenarios) and
ioff (thus, the no CCS scenarios), for all the climate targets. BAU results are always reported for
benchmarking purposes. In particular, Figures 10 (i20) and 12 (ioff) report the absolute generations, while
Figures 11 (i20) and 13 (ioff) report the relative shares.
These figures help visualize how coal, and then gas, are progressively phased-out in the mitigation
scenarios. This happens smoothly over the decades in the milder mitigation scenarios, quite strongly after
2025 in the more stringent scenarios. Naturally, the phase-out is more urgent for coal than for gas, as the
former is characterized by specific emissions which are about twice as those of the latter. In the i20
scenarios, fossil phase-out is compensated by the progressive CCS penetration, in addition to the massive
deployment of renewables.
Furthermore, Figures 8 and 9 highlighted that biomass without CCS is barely present in the electricity mix in
2100. Indeed, Figures 10 to 13 show that this technological solution does have a non-negligible penetration
in the first decades, but then it is phased out, underlining that in the long run biomass is appealing only if
coupled with CCS technologies in order to allow negative emissions.
Finally, it has already been noted that the 1.5°C scenarios would imply a huge cut in the electric generation
immediately after 2015 in order to meet with the carbon mitigation requirements. Indeed, this implies an
immediate retirement of most (i20) or all (ioff) fossil plants. As a result, the 2025 electricity mixes are
(almost) completely characterized by a carbon-free generation deriving from hydro, nuclear, and variable
renewables. It has already been discussed that this scenario is really extreme, but it is interesting to explore
these barely-feasible conditions for comparison purposes.
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Figure 10 – Global electricity mix over time in the i20 scenarios (unconstrained CCS): absolute generation.
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Figure 11 – Global electricity mix over time in the i20 scenarios (unconstrained CCS): relative shares.
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Figure 12 – Global electricity mix over time in the ioff scenarios (no CCS): absolute generation.
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Figure 13 – Global electricity mix over time in the ioff scenarios (no CCS): relative shares.
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Figure 14 shows the policy costs in the different scenarios. Policy costs are evaluated as the cumulative GDP
loss over the century with respect to the cumulative GDP in the baseline case, considering an annual
discount factor of 2.5%. Values are shown on the same scale, in order to facilitate a comparison of the
orders of magnitude across the different scenarios.

Figure 14 – Policy costs (global GDP loss with respect to the baseline scenario).

Policy costs in the 3.5°C scenarios are negligible, around 0.2%: after all, the stringency of the target is very
mild, so the required changes to the economic and energy systems are almost null. As discussed in the
previous pages, CCS is not deployed in these scenarios, so results are not differentiated per CCS
deployment year within this target. A moderate difference emerges in the 3°C scenarios, where policy costs
are around 0.7-1%. In particular the ioff scenario has a policy cost which is 35% higher than the i20
scenario. In the 2.5°C scenarios, policy costs range between 1.9% and 2.7%, with the no CCS case costing
38% more than the unconstrained CCS scenario. If reaching 2.5°C entails relatively moderate costs,
achieving the Paris-compatible 2°C target implies much higher expenses. If CCS can be deployed with no
constraints, the aggregated GDP loss is 4.7%. This values increases with a progressively delayed CCS
deployment, up to 7.1% in the no CCS case, i.e. 51% more than the former. Finally, the profound revolution
which is required to achieve the 1.5°C target has inevitable enormous effects on the policy costs: with a
fully unconstrained technology portfolio the policy cost is about 16.1%, while it rises up to 27.6% in the
corresponding ioff case, i.e. 72% more than the unconstrained case. Therefore, not only is the delayed
deployment of CCS impacting on the policy cost, but this impact increases in relative terms with the policy
stringency.
19
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5.

Conclusions

CCS is considered one of the key technologies for climate change mitigation, and in particular for the
decarbonization of the power sector. Its main advantage consists in eliminating carbon dioxide emissions
without shifting away from the fossil-based paradigm which still characterizes this sector. However, in
reality many issues still hinder its diffusion, such as safety concerns about storage sites, public acceptance,
high technology costs, and the absence of a common regulatory framework and of business models.
The main aim of this work is to explore the effects that a delayed deployment of CCS can have on the
power system and on the economy. Five deployment options have been considered, based on the starting
year from which CCS installation is allowed: 2020 (i.e. the unconstrained scenario, as global CCS capacity is
practically negligible as of today), 2040, 2060, and 2080, in addition to the no CCS scenario. These five
scenarios have been explored over a wide set of policy targets, ranging from the no policy or Business-asUsual scenario, which leads to 4°C as a temperature increase in 2100 with respect to the pre-industrial
levels, to 1.5°C.
Scenarios confirm the consolidated result in the literature that CCS is likely to play a major role in the
decarbonization of the electricity sector at a global level, as it is installed in all scenarios with a policy target
equal to 3°C or less. In all these cases, as soon as the investment in CCS is allowed, this option is
immediately activated by the optimization model. Due to expansion constraints, the delayed installation
prevents CCS from reaching the optimal level which would be achieved in the unconstrained scenarios.
This implies a progressively lower penetration in the electricity mix as the deployment is delayed: global
CCS penetration is around 25-30% in 2100 in all scenarios from 1.5°C to 3°C, gradually decreasing to zero as
the deployment is delayed or not allowed. The contribution from coal, gas, and biomass is quite well
balanced. The overall electricity demand diminishes with the progressively delayed CCS deployment. This
decrease is indeed quite little if the mitigation effort is limited to 2°C (the difference is lower than 5% in
across scenarios), while it is more marked in the 1.5°C scenarios, where the difference in 2100 between the
i20 and ioff scenarios is around 15%. The absence of CCS is mostly compensated by renewables (notably
wind and solar), with also a moderate increase in nuclear.
Removing (partially or totally) CCS from the optimal electricity mix has significant effects on the overall
economic performance. The analysis on the changes in policy costs shows that, within the specific policy
targets, the no CCS scenario is characterized by a relative cumulative GDP loss which is from 35% to 72%
higher than the corresponding unconstrained CCS scenarios, thus highlighting the strong economic impact
of the delayed CCS deployment. Lower differences are found for the more moderate mitigation scenarios
(35% is the result obtained if the climate target is 3°C), while the distance broadens as the policy objective
becomes more stringent (72% is the relative difference across the 1.5°C scenarios).
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